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Abstract In the paper, the cooperative game with a hypergraph commu-
nication structure is considered. For this class of games, a new allocation
rule was proposed by splitting the original game into a game between hy-
perlinks and games within them. The communication possibilities are de-
scribed by the hypergraph in which the nodes are players and hyperlinks are
the communicating subgroups of players. The game between hyperlinks and
between players in each hyperlink is described. The payo of each player
is inuenced by the actions of other players dependent on the distance be-
tween them on hypergraph. Constructed characteristic functions based on
cooperative behaviour satisfy the convexity property. The results are shown
by the example.
Keywords: cooperation, characteristic function, hypergraph, communica-
tion structure.
1. Introduction
In classic cooperative games with transferable utility, it is assumed that all
players have an opportunity to form a grand coalition and the total payo from the
cooperation can be distributed among the players.
In general cases, not all players can communicate with each other due to some
economic, transport and other restrictions. To dene the possibilities of communica-
tion the communication structure can be used. The undirected graph can represent a
communication structure. In the graph, only nodes that have an edge between them
can interact. Such class of games was initially studied by Myerson (Myerson, 1977).
After that, games with communication structure have received attention in coopera-
tive game theory. Owen (Owen, 1986) studied games with a tree as a communication
structure. Meessen (Meessen, 1988) introduced the positional value for the games
with graph communication structure.
The TU-games with hypergraph communication structure were studied by Nouwe-
land, Borm and Tijs (Nouweland et al., 1992). They characterized the Myerson
value and the positional value for these games. The third value, which is called de-
gree value for games with a hypergraph communication structure, was introduced
in (Shan et al., 2018).
In the paper cooperative games with hypergraph communication structure are
considered. We propose two-level based approach for these games. The paper is or-
ganized as follows. First, basic denitions and notations concerning the hypergraph
communication structure are given. Then the denition of the game with discounted
payo function is provided. Next, described two-level based approach and subgames
between and inside hyperlinks are considered. Finally, the results are explained on
an example.
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2. Communication Structure
In the paper, we consider a game with a hypergraph communication structure.
Hypergraph is a generalization of a graph in which an edge can join any number of
vertices. In contrast, in an ordinary graph, an edge connects exactly two vertexes.
Formally hypergraph is a pair (N,H ), H ⊆ {H ∈ 2N
∣∣|H| ⩾ 2}, where N is a
nite set of nodes and H is a given set of subsets of N , each element in H is called
hyperlink. Notice that the cardinality |H| should be greater or equal to two. If all
hyperlinks include only 2 nodes the hypergraph can be considered as a graph. A
simple example of a hypergraph is presented in Fig.1.
Fig. 1. Example of Hypergraph
Reduction of hypergraph (N,H ) can be obtained by removing all hyperlinks
which are entirely included in other hyperlinks from the original hypergraph (N,H
′
).
If a hypergraph coincides with its reduction, that is, it does not have hyperlinks
inside others, such hypergraph is called reduced.
The path between two hyperlinks Hi and Hj is a sequence of hyperlinks
Hk1 , Hk2 , . . . ,Hkl where:
1)Hi = Hk1 , Hj = Hkl
2)∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, Hli ∩Hli+1 ̸= ∅.
The minimal path between two hyperlinks is the path that contains minimal
number of hyperlinks.
The distance between two vertexes i, j is dened as the number of hyperlinks l
in the minimal path between hyperlinks Hk1 , Hkl where i ∈ Hk1 , j ∈ Hkl
Two vertexes that have a path between them are called connected. Dene neigh-
bours with level k for each node.
Neighbours of vertex i ∈ N with level 1 are vertexes j ∈ N1i that are at distance
1 from i. Neighbours of vertex i ∈ N with level k are vertexes j ∈ Nki that are at
distance k from i, etc. Finally, the vertexes which have no connection with i are
denoted by N−1i . For any i ∈ N the set of vertexes is split into neighbors with levels
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k ∈ [1, . . . , li,−1] denoted by Nki where li is the maximal distance of connected
vertex from i.
3. Denition of the game
In the game setting, the set of vertexes N is identied with the set of players.
Thus N := {1, . . . , n} is considered as set of players. The communication structure
is described by a reduced hypergraph.
Consider that each player i choose the strategy uji to play with connected player
j from a given set of strategies UJi . Suppose that U
J
i is a nite set of strategies. The
set of players connected with player i denote as Ni. Denote vector the strategies of
player i for all connected players as ui = (u
m1
i , . . . , u
mk
i ) where k = |Ni|,mj ∈ Ni.
Also denote u = (u1, . . . , un).
Consider the communication between all connected players. It is natural to sup-
pose that the distance between players should inuence the payos. Dene the
discount parameter δ ∈ (0; 1).
Denote by li the distance between player i and the farthest connected player.










j), δ ∈ (0, 1), h
j
i (ui, uj) ≥ 0, i, j ∈ N.
Where hji (ui, uj) is the payo from pairwise interaction between player i and j.
4. Cooperation
Now consider the cooperative game, that is, players agree to choose their strate-





Ki(u1, . . . , un) =
∑
i∈N
Ki(û1, . . . , ûn),
û = (û1, . . . , ûn) is a cooperative behaviour.
Characteristic function v(S) is a real-valued function v : 2N → R and v(∅) = 0.
In the classical cooperative game theory the characteristic function is dened by







Ki(u1, . . . , un), S ⊆ N, (1)
here uS = {ui}, i ∈ S and uN\S = {ui}, i ∈ N \ S.
From denition it is follow that v(N) =
∑
i∈N Ki(û1, . . . , ûn).
In this paper, we assume that the players which are not included in the coalition
S destroy the communications with players in coalition S. In other words, after the
coalition is xed the restriction of a hypergraph is considered by eliminating all
players i ∈ N \ S.
As a solution of the game, we propose a two-level based approach. On the rst
level, the hyperlinks are considered as players. The characteristic function is in-
troduced in the game with hyperlinks as players. As a result, the maximal sum of
payos obtained by cooperative behaviour is distributed among hyperlinks. On the
second level, the cooperative game inside a hyperlink is considered, where players
are nodes in this hyperlink.
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4.1. Game between hyperlinks
In this section we consider the game between hyperlinks as players and call them
h-players. Denote all coalitions of h-players as Ŝ and NŜ =
⋃
Hi∈Ŝ Hi.
The characteristic function is dened using cooperative behaviour. The approach
is similar to one proposed in (Bulgakova and Petrosyan, 2019).
Suppose that for any coalition Ŝ, the communication structure is constructed
and denote by Nk
Ŝ,i
, i ∈ NŜ the neighbours with a connection level k in NŜ for
player i. Also let lŜi be a distance between player i and the farthest player in NŜ .
Dene the characteristic function V for the game with h-players in the following
way:




































It is interesting to note that under previous assumptions about the elimina-
tion of hyperlinks and pairwise interaction this denition of characteristic function
coincides with classical maxmin characteristic function (1).
Theorem 1 (Convexity). For any two coalitions of h-players A, B we have
V (A ∪B) ≥ V (B) + V (A)− V (A ∩B). (2)










































































































































































































































































After substituting these expressions into (2) and moving all the components to
the left, we get the following inequality:

























j) ≥ 0. (3)
Because hji ≥ 0 then (3) holds and the theorem is proved.
The proof is quite similar to (Tur and Petrosyan, 2021) and is presented here for
completeness of presentation.
To dene the payos for each hyperlink we distribute the maximal sum pro-
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4.2. Game inside a hyperlink
On the second level, we consider the game inside each hyperlink. The character-





















This characteristic function is convex, that is, the Shapley value belongs to the




(|S| − 1)!(|N | − |S|)!
|N |!
(v(S)− v(S \ {i})).
Denote as Hi the hyperlinks which contain player i. The payos of hyperlinks
obtained on the previous level are distributed proportionally to the Shapley value.
Final allocation for the player i obtained by summing the payos from each hyper-













Consider the cooperative game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} δ = 0.5
and hypergraph H = {H1 = {1, 2}, H2 = {2, 3, 4}, H3 = {4, 5, 6}H4 = {6, 7}}
which is shown on the gure 2:
Fig. 2. Communication structure
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In this example, we consider the case when each player plays a bimatrix game
with players which have a connection with him. All players have the same sets of
strategies ui = {A,B}. A is the strategy to choose the rst row/column and B to
choose the second.
Payos of players 1 and 2, 1 and 3, 1 and 4, 1 and 5 are represented in the form
of the following 2× 2 matrices:(
(11, 4) (3, 15)
(13, 9) (20, 5)
)(
(3, 2) (4, 9)
(13, 1) (7, 4)
)(
(13, 2) (13, 6)
(11, 11) (3, 17)
)(
(4, 7) (3, 9)
(15, 3) (7, 17)
)
Payos of players 1 and 6, 1 and 7, 2 and 3, 2 and 4 :(
(0, 2) (6, 16)
(2, 8) (10, 8)
)(
(14, 9) (12, 20)
(7, 6) (3, 20)
)(
(1, 20) (16, 5)
(8, 15) (7, 3)
)(
(11, 11) (10, 17)
(14, 20) (8, 14)
)
For players 2 and 5, 2 and 6, 2 and 7, 3 and 4:(
(17, 5) (10, 6)
(19, 9) (6, 2)
)(
(16, 14) (14, 7)
(6, 9) (13, 3)
)(
(1, 14) (1, 19)
(7, 9) (8, 19)
)(
(4, 1) (3, 6)
(12, 18) (9, 10)
)
Payos of players 3 and 5, 3 and 6, 3 and 7, 4 and 5:(
(9, 9) (10, 7)
(13, 6) (19, 2)
)(
(14, 15) (16, 12)
(5, 13) (8, 13)
)(
(2, 12) (1, 8)
(10, 6) (14, 5)
)(
(15, 12) (6, 14)
(12, 6) (4, 2)
)
Payos of players 4 and 6, 4 and 7, 5 and 6, 5 and 7, 6 and 7:(
(3, 12) (9, 11)
(14, 7) (3, 15)
)(
(19, 19) (12, 1)
(12, 4) (2, 6)
)(
(16, 6) (8, 7)
(2, 16) (19, 2)
)
(
(13, 5) (6, 17)
(14, 14) (7, 17)
)(
(14, 5) (2, 13)
(7, 11) (10, 2)
)
Firstly nd the cooperative behaviour which maximizes the total sum of payos.
Table 1. Cooperative behaviour and payos from pairwise interaction
û21 = B û
1
2 = B û
1
3 = A û
1
4 = A û
1
5 = B û
1
6 = B û
1
7 = B
h21 = 20 h
1
2 = 5 h
1
3 = 1 h
1
4 = 11 h
1
5 = 17 h
1
6 = 16 h
1
7 = 20
û31 = B û
3
2 = B û
2
3 = A û
2
4 = A û
2
5 = A û
2
6 = A û
2
7 = B
h31 = 13 h
3
2 = 8 h
2
3 = 15 h
2
4 = 20 h
2
5 = 9 h
2
6 = 14 h
2
7 = 19
û41 = B û
4
2 = B û
4
3 = B û
3
4 = A û
3
5 = B û
3
6 = A û
3
7 = B
h41 = 11 h
4
2 = 14 h
4
3 = 12 h
3
4 = 18 h
3
5 = 2 h
3
6 = 15 h
3
7 = 5
û51 = B û
5
2 = B û
5
3 = B û
5
4 = A û
4
5 = A û
4
6 = A û
4
7 = A
h51 = 7 h
5
2 = 19 h
5
3 = 19 h
5
4 = 15 h
4
5 = 12 h
4
6 = 7 h
4
7 = 19
û61 = A û
6
2 = A û
6
3 = A û
6
4 = B û
6
5 = A û
5
6 = A û
5
7 = B
h61 = 6 h
6
2 = 16 h
6
3 = 14 h
6
4 = 14 h
6
5 = 16 h
5
6 = 6 h
5
7 = 14
û71 = A û
7
2 = B û
7
3 = B û
7
4 = A û
7
5 = B û
7
6 = A û
6
7 = A
h71 = 12 h
7
2 = 8 h
7
3 = 14 h
7
4 = 19 h
7
5 = 14 h
7
6 = 14 h
6
7 = 5
Now we need to calculate the values of the characteristic function for h-players
and distribution for them.
V (H1) = 25, V (H2) = 87, V (H3) = 70, V (H4) = 19, V (H ) = 201,
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KH1 = 66.54, KH2 = 231.57, KH3 = 186.32, KH4 = 50.57.
On the second level we have three games on each hyperlink.
Game on H1.
v(1) = v(2) = v(∅) = 0, v(1, 2) = 25,




v(2) = v(3) = v(4) = v(∅) = 0,
v(2, 3) = 23, v(2, 4) = 34, v(3, 4) = 30, v(2, 3, 4) = 87,
ϕH22 = 28.5, ϕ
H2




v(4) = v(5) = v(6) = v(∅) = 0,
v(4, 5) = 27, v(4, 6) = 21, v(5, 6) = 22, v(4, 5, 6) = 87,
ϕH34 = 24, ϕ
H3




v(6) = v(7) = v(∅) = 0, v(6, 7) = 19,
ϕH36 = 9.5, ϕ
H3
7 = 9.5.







































































In the paper cooperative games with hypergraph communication structure was
considered. Proposed two-level based approach for such class of games. Proved that
the characteristic function for h-players is convex. The proposed solution divides the
original game into subgames which reduced the complexity of calculations. Results
were shown by the example.
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